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I. INTRODUCTION
If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck-isn't it
a duck? Not necessarily, if your ducks are mobile devices like PDAs and
cell phones. These communication handsets are hybrids, chimeric' devices
capable of delivering a myriad of mobile services including telephone,
Internet, and now video. Recently, wireless telecommunication providers
and program content providers have been turning their attention to mobile
video services, known as Mobile TV2 or the "third screen.",
3
Industry forecasters predict that Mobile TV is poised to become the
"next great broadband opportunity.",4 "It's all about the third screen," com-
1 In Greek Mythology, a chimera was a monster with the head of a lion, body of a goat
and tail of a serpent. In the science community, chimera molecules, organisms, or sub-
stances are created from differing proteins or genes from two separate and distinct species.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 154 (3d ed. 1994). For
the purposes of this Comment, "chimeric" technology refers to communication technology
that is comprised of hybrid technologies.
2 For definitions of Mobile TV see PCMag.com, Encyclopedia,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopediaterml0,2542,t=mobile+TV&i=55911,00.asp (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006); Olga Khanf, TV Phones Prep for Prime Time, Bus. WK. Dec. 1,
2004,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/dec2004/tc2004121_1328_tc 1 19.htm.
NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 910 (22d ed. 2006) ("The first screen was your
television set. The second screen was the PC. The third screen is now the screen on you
digital cell phone.")
4 Leslie Cauley, New Sprint Nextel Will Focus on 3rd Screen, USA TODAY, Aug. 9,
2005, at 3B; see also JUNIPER RESEARCH, TV on the Move 1 (White Paper, Sept. 2005),
[hereinafter TV on the Move] available
athttp://www.juniperresearch.comlpdfs/white-paper-mobiletv.pdf (discussing how Mobile
TV has already increased in subscription numbers in countries such as France and Ger-
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mented Sprint CEO, Gary Forsee.5 Although Mobile TV technology is in
its infancy, the global revenues for the service are projected to increase
from $136 million in 2005 to more than $7.6 billion by 2010.6 The total
number of users worldwide is expected to rise from 26 million in 2005 to
over 211 million by 2009.7 The bulk of the market penetration is expected
to be derived from the provision of sports and infotainment content.8
Currently, Mobile TV services are delivered via third generation mobile
technology ("3G"),9 a platform that also supports wireless broadband,
voice, and text.' ° 3G is a vast improvement over the so-called second gen-
eration technology ("2G")," and has allowed for improved picture quality
and download speeds in Mobile TV services.' 2 Moreover, 3G technology
allows consumers to watch real-time video instead of downloading clips,
and it provides an optimal platform for downloading large amounts of
video content.1
3
With potential revenues estimated in the billions of dollars over the next
five years, it is not surprising that a variety of content providers, including
ESPN, its parent company Disney, CBS, NBC and even adult entertain-
ment companies, are actively seeking to solidify their share of this new
many, which suggests that Mobile TV could become a large revenue for the communica-
tions industry).
5 Cauley, supra note 4.
6 TV on the Move, supra note 4, at 3.
7 JUNIPER RESEARCH, Mobile Sport & Infotainment Essentials 2 (White Paper, Feb.
2005) [hereinafter Mobile Sport & Infotainment], available at
http://www.juniperresearch.com/pdfs/white-paper-msportandinfo2.pdf (discussing that
sports and infotainment content have become increasingly popular with the advancement of
2G technology and the immediacy of such information due to increased capabilities such as
live streaming of events and through mobile channel usage). Infotainment includes a range
content form news media to soap operas. Id. at 1.
8 Id.
9 See Cauley, supra note 4 (noting that Tim Donahue, CEO of Nextel, predicts that 4G
technology will be deployed as early as 2008, but the technology is still under develop-
ment).
't Press Release, WirelessDevNet.com, Nortel and NSERC Establish Advanced Tele-
communications Technology Research Chair (June 9, 2006), available at
http://www.wirelessdevnet.com/news/2006/un/09/news5.html ("3G networks will make
possible such services as mobile telehealth, instant Internet applications, new online finan-
cial and shopping capabilities, as well as entertainment services that include rapid music
downloads, live sports, and mobile gaming.").
11 Mobile Sport & Infotainment, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that the primary uses of 2G
technology which includes the dissemination of news).
12 Cauley, supra note 4; see also Ben Charny, For Cell Phones, It's TV to the Rescue,
CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 25, 2004, http://news.com.com/2100-1039_3-5423178.html.
13 See TV on the Move, supra note 4. "A 3G cellular network.., is required to provide
control functions to support interactivity and facilitate user authorization to the service.
Equally important, the 3G network provides a basis for interactivity, including purchase and
download transactions." MEDIAFLO, QUALCOMM, FLow TECHNOLOGY OVERvIEw 6 (2005),




video marketplace. 4 On the transmission side of the Mobile TV industry,
wireless service providers have added Mobile TV in an effort to preserve
their customer base.
15
Mobile TV service is analogous to other video services such as cable and
broadcast in that it requires both a network operator and a content pro-
vider.16 However, because it is neither broadcast nor cable television ser-
vice, the question arises: do content regulations apply? In the past, the
method of service transmission has dictated whether and how content is
regulated. Transmission of video content to mobile devices does not fall
easily into a regulatory paradigm because it utilizes three communications
technologies-broadband, wireless telephone spectrum, and interconnec-
tion to the Internet-that traditionally have been subjected to distinct regu-
latory frameworks.'
7
This Comment explores if and how video content transmitted on mobile
devices should be regulated. Part II begins by considering the public policy
reasons in favor of regulating Mobile TV in light of the technology's po-
tential to increase the exposure of indecent material to children. Part II of
this Comment examines how Mobile TV service would be classified within
the existing communications regulatory framework established by the 1996
Telecommunications Act ("1996 Act").'8 Part IV discusses potential First
14 See, e.g., Verizon Wireless.com, Verizon Get it Now,
http://getitnow.v2wshop.com/index.aspx?i2=vcast (detailing how Disney, CBS, and NBC
work with current telephone service operators like Verizon, Sprint, and Cingular to offer
pre-recorded video clips that can be downloaded onto mobile devices) (last visited Nov. 11,
2006) [hereinafter Verizon Get It Now]; SprintPCS.com, Sprint TV,
http://wwwl.sprintpcs.com/explore/ueContent.jsp?scTopic=multimedia (last visited Nov.
20, 2006) [hereinafter Sprint TV]; see also Gary Krakow, The First Cell Phone for Sports
Fanatics, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 2, 2006, http://msnbc.msn.comi/id/l1146561/; see generally
Marguerite Reardon, Big Brands Go Cellular, CNETNEws.coM, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://news.com.com/2100-1039_3-6034596.html; Xobile, http://www.xobile.com (last
visited Nov. 11, 2006).
15 Sprint TV, supra note 14; Verizon Get it Now, supra note 14.
16 See discussion infra Part IlL
17 Louis Trager, FCC 'Family Friendly' Rules Seen Vulnerable to Challenge, COMMU-
NICATIONS DAILY, vol. 26 (Aug. 4, 2006) ("[hybrid technologies will] erase traditional legal
distinctions among electronic media... Cellphone video.. .will challenge traditional regula-
tory structures."). Professsor Roy Moore of Georgia College and State University com-
mented to Communications Daily that "the technology that probably is going to have the
biggest impact or face the most regulation is cell phones ... since no one has even consid-
ered regulating wireless phone use for content." Id. (internal quotations omitted). See also
Posting of Adam Thierer to Progress and Freedom Foundation's Center for Digital Media
Freedom, http:/lblog.pff.org/archives/2005/03/is-cellphone_c.html (Mar. 10, 2005) [here-
inafter "Adam Thierer Remarks"], for the remarks of Adam Thierer, Senior Fellow and
Director of the Progress and Freedom Foundation's Center for Digital Media Freedom,
stating that "[w]ithin the next two years, legislation will be introduced proposing the exten-
sion of the FCC's current clear-as-mud indecency rules to mobile content and devices."
18 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 47 U.S.C.).
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Amendment pitfalls of government imposed content-based regulations.
Part V applies the First Amendment lessons from content-restrictions in
other mediums to conclude that similar regulations of Mobile TV would be
unconstitutional. Having concluded that government imposed content-
based regulations are not a viable option, Part VI of this Comment exam-
ines the positive role parents and industry members can play furthering the
public interest by protecting children from indecent content.
II. ANTICIPATING THE CALL FOR REGULATION: MOBILE TV
AND INDECENT CONTENT
A. The Adult Entertainment Industry is Positioned to be a Dominant User
of Mobile TV Technology
Mobile TV offers the ability for consumers and content providers to in-
teract in a new and innovative way. Mobile TV content providers include
traditional television broadcasters, movie studios, and non-mainstream
providers. 9 The adult movie industry has already begun to market content
for Mobile TV, a move that has prompted concerns about children gaining
access to indecent or other inappropriate material.20 As of late 2006, regu-
lations regarding content distribution over mobile devices are nonexistent.
However, many telecommunications service providers have taken the ini-
tiative to restrict their customers through customer service agreements
from accessing content that is considered indecent.2' Yet, while these li-
censing agreements exist, they do not provide the wireless service provider
19 See discussion supra Part I; see also Mark Halper, Warner Takes TV, Movies Mobile,
VIDEO BusINEss ONLINE, Feb. 17, 2006,
http://www.videobusiness.com/index.asp?layout=article&articleid=CA6308729 (discussing
Warner Brothers' creation of its own mobile Internet site).
20 See Press Release, CTIA, Wireless Carriers Announce "Wireless Content Guide-
lines", (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter CTIA Press Release], available at
http://www.ctia.org/news-media/press/body.cfm?record-id=1565 (describing the content
classification standard of the Wireless Content Guidelines which would allow for the divi-
sion and regulation of "generally accessible" content from "restricted content").
21 See, e.g., Cingular Wireless, Cingular Wireless Acceptable Use Policy,
http://www.cingular.com/acceptable-use-policy (lasted visited Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter
Cingular Use Policy]. Cingular's customer service agreement provides that:
Content Harmful or Offensive to Third-Parties: Do not upload, download, post, dis-
tribute, publish, or otherwise transmit (collectively, "Disclose") any message, data, in-
formation, image, text, or other material (collectively, "Content") that is unlawful, li-
belous, defamatory, slanderous, obscene, pornographic, indecent, lewd, harassing,
threatening, harmful, invasive of privacy or publicity rights, abusive, inflammatory, or
otherwise harmful or offensive to third parties...
[Vol. 15
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with the means to prevent customers from accessing offensive content.2 2
Accordingly, the wireless service providers have extensive exculpatory
clauses releasing the carrier from third-party liability should the customer
access offensive content.23 The players in the Mobile TV arena have varied
and often conflicting agendas: the consumer wants unbridled access to
content of his or her choosing; the content publisher wants to increase its
viewing audience; the wireless provider wants the most profitable ar-
rangement; and the regulator wants to ensure the protection of community
standards by restricting access to indecent material.
Many adult entertainment providers see an opportunity for significant
revenue. Larry Flynt, founder of Hustler Entertainment, recently remarked,
"Hustler Mobile is doing exceedingly well in Europe .... I feel that wire-
less is the wave of the future, the crown jewel in the electronic distribution
and delivery of content. 24 This is largely because mobile devices provide
an optimum platform for the consumption of adult entertainment due to
their easy access, privacy, and overall mobility.
Xobile.com is one of the first adult Internet firms to offer its customers
pornographic video formatted exclusively for mobile devices. 6 Customers
can purchase two-minute videos for about forty-four cents with a credit
card on Xobile.com, 27 and can elect to stream the video onto a mobile de-
vice for immediate viewing or download the video to view at a later time.28
Xobile.com provides content for Mobile TV applications even though it is
not a Mobile TV service provider. This niche has proven successful: as a
result of offering mobile content, Xobile.com added six thousand custom-
22 See CTIA Press Release, supra note 20 ("In the interim, consumers may choose indi-
vidually whether or not to purchase wireless Internet service.").
23 An example of a wireless carrier's exculpatory clause is demonstrated by Cingular's
Use Policy:
Our Responsibility: We take no responsibility and assume no liability for any Content
uploaded, transmitted, or downloaded by you or any third party, or for any mistakes,
defamation, slander, libel, omissions, falsehoods, obscenity, pornography, or profanity
you may encounter. As the provider of the Cingular Sites and Service, we are only a
forum and are not liable for any statements, representations, or Content provided by
our users in any public forum...
Cingular Use Policy, supra note 21.
24 Colin Gibbs, CTIA Sets Adult Content Guidelines as Hustler Comes to U.S. Wireless
Users, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Mar. 10, 2005,
http://www.spyonit.comlib/img/resourcectr/RCR_03.10.05.pdf.
5 Matt Richtel & Michel Marriott, Ringtones, Cameras, Now This: Sex is Latest Cell-
phone Feature, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 17, 2005, at Al. Industry analyst Roger Entner, com-
mented that Mobile TV "has every component that has proven conducive to the consump-
tion of adult entertainment." Id.
26 Xobile, Why Xoble?, http://www.xobile.com/pc/webmaster.cfm (last visited Nov. 11,
2006).
27 Richtel & Marriott, supra note 25.
28 Xobile, How it Works, www.xobile.com/pc/howitworks.cfm (last visited Nov. 11,
2006); Richtel & Marriott, supra note 25.
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ers.29 Other adult entertainment industry leaders such as Playboy and Vivid
Entertainment are also developing methods to tap into the Mobile TV mar-
ket.3°
Juniper Research forecasts that there is a "strong market for adult to mo-
bile services ... and alongside games and infotainment, adult will be one
of the leading content types that will drive the initial use of mobile enter-
tainment services.' Juniper estimates that the total global market value
for mobile adult content will triple to nearly $2.1 billion by 2009.32 These
projections are based on the value of the global adult market, which is es-
timated between $31 billion and $75 billion dollars (the latter including
everything from strip clubs to magazines, and DVDs to phone sex lines).33
The proliferation of wireless video-capable devices will enable these pre-
dicted expansions of the mobile adult entertainment market. 34 But, as these
devices become widely available, the danger exists that children will in-
creasingly gain access to the potentially troublesome content available
through Mobile TV.35 Therefore, it is realistic to anticipate that there will
be challenges to adult video-content distribution on such devices.36
How Mobile TV is classified is critical to the level of governmental in-
trusion that it will receive. If the service is classified like broadcast then it
will be subject to greater content restrictions.37 Conversely, if Mobile TV is
designated an information service, then any attempts by the Government to
regulate content will be challenging.38 Under the 1996 Act, Congress ex-
plicitly determined that services that fell within the category of "informa-
tion services" were to remain unhindered by excessive restrictions so that
29 Richtel & Marriott, supra note 25.
30 See, e.g., Cassell Bryan-Low & David Pringle, Sex Cells-Wireless Operators in
Euorpe, Asia Find that Racy Cellphone Video Drives a Surge in Broadband Use, WALL ST.
J., May 12, 2005, at B 1 ("Playboy is working with Dwango Wireless Inc., a provider of
wireless technology, to strike deals with U.S. cellphone operators to offer its product to
subscribers. Pictures are likely to cost between 99 cents and $1.99 ...according to
Dwango"); see also Richtel & Marriott, supra note 25; Monica Hatcher, Porn Coming to a
Cell Near You, TIMES LEADER, Jan. 29, 2006, at D1.
31 Windsor Holden, Adult to Mobile: Personal Services, (Juniper Research, White Paper
2d ed. Feb, 2005), http://www.juniperresearch.com/pdfs/white-paper-madult2.pdf [herein-
after Adult to Mobile].
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id. at 1.
34 Gary Strauss, Cellphone Technology Rings in Pornography in USA, USA TODAY,
Dec. 12, 2005, at I D.
35 See Letter from John Muleta, Chief, Wireless Telecom. Bureau, FCC, to Steve
Largent, President, CTIA-the Wireless Association, (Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter FCC-to-
CTIA Letter], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs~public/attachmatch/DOC-
256795Al.pdf ("The development of new wireless technologies presents both benefits and
risks to consumers, especially those consumers who are most vulnerable-children.").
36 See id.
37 See discussion infra Part IV.D. 1.38 See discussion infra Part IV.D.4.
[Vol. 15
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nascent technologies would have the opportunity to make their way onto
the market thereby benefiting the consumer.39 In keeping with its original
purpose, Congress has been careful when developing content-based legis-
lation that pertains to information services. 40 Indeed, the courts have re-
peatedly reviewed content based restrictions affecting the medium under
the strictest scrutiny and have not hesitated to determine statutes unconsti-
tutional.41 Accordingly, the Government would be unjustified in imposing
anticipatory content restrictions on Mobile TV because it is a burgeoning
technology that is best classified as an information service.
B. Government Intervention and Regulation of Mobile TV Content
The courts have repeatedly held that protecting children from indecent or
harmful content is a legitimate governmental objective.42 However, assum-
ing that Mobile TV is classified as an information service, case law has
sufficiently demonstrated that this type of service is to operate with mini-
mal government intrusion so as to preserve an open marketplace of ideas.43
Additionally, preemptive legislative action concerning obscenity and inde-
cency on the Internet has been struck down as unconstitutional because the
proposed statute is either overly broad, has a chilling effect on speech, or
because there are normally less restrictive alternatives on the market that
will achieve the same goal of protecting children from harmful content.44
III. MOBILE TV UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: THE
CLASSIFICATION CHALLENGE
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, (the "Act" or "Commu-
nications Act") applies a "silo" model of regulation in which communica-
tions are distinguished based on transmission technology and thus regu-
lated according to different principles.45 In other words, Mobile TV classi-
39 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
40 See discussion infra Part IV.D.4.
41 See id.
42 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (holding that the
government has a compelling interest to protect children from pornographic material).
43 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670
(2004).
44 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875; Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670; see also discussion infra Part
IV.
45 See generally Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Adam Theier, Are "Dumb Pipe" Mandates Smart Public
Policy?: Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. TELECOM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 275, 280 (2005) ("The traditional vertical 'silo' model of communica-
tions industry regulation views each industry sector as a distinct set of entities that do
not interact and which should be regulated under different principles.").
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fication under the silo approach is complicated by the fact that the service
blends elements of wireless telephone service, Internet, broadcast, and ca-
ble, all of which receive distinct treatment under the Act. Thus, classifica-
tion of Mobile TV under the Act is the key to assessing the potential need
for and application of content regulations.
A. Although Mobile TV Uses Wireless Telephony Service to Transmit
Content, It Should Not be Classified as "Telecommunications" or "Tele-
communications Service"
Mobile TV relies on wireless, or mobile, telecommunications for its
transmission. 4 The 1996 Act,47 the last major overhaul of communications
law, classified telecommunications as the "transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.,
48
Moreover, a service that offers "telecommunications for a fee directly to
the public ... regardless of the facilities used" is considered a "telecom-
munications service" under the Act.49 Thus, "[a] telecommunications ser-
vice is a telecommunications service regardless of whether it is provided
using wireline, wireless, cable, satellite, or some other infrastructure,"5 so
long as the transmission does not change in form or content between the
source and the destination, and is provided for a fee. The telecommunica-
tions service classification arose out of the public-switched telephone net-
work ("PSTN") model where voice information is transferred linearly from
one fixed point to another.5' A land-line phone user with plain old tele-
phone service connects directly with the PSTN, which switches the call to
the intended destination.52 Mobile telephone service works in much the
46 JUNIPER RESEARCH, Mobile TV Watch it Grow 1-2 (White Paper, July 2006), avail-
able at http://www.juniperresearch.com/pdfs/whitepaper-mobiletv2.pdf.
47 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.)
48 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
49 § 153(46).
50 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13
F.C.C.R. 11,501, 59 (Apr. 10, 1998).
51 NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 738 (22d ed. 2006) ("[T]he worldwide voice tele-
phone network accessible to all those with telephones and access privileges.").
52 Id. at 718 ("Plain Old Telephone Service ["POTS"] ... [is t]he basic service supply-
ing standard single line telephones, telephone lines and access to the public switched net-
work.... Just receive and place calls .... All POTS lines work on loop start signaling...
."); see also Chdrie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation On The Horizon: Are Regu-
lators Poised To Address the Status of IP Telephony?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 19, 20-




same way as traditional wireline telephony. The voice is digitized and
then transmitted via radio waves to cellular towers.54 The towers then use
the PSTN switching network to relay the communication to an end-user."
Like traditional wireline, the content of the communication is not changed
56 Bcuetduring transmission. Because the two services function similarly, mobile
telephone service providers are treated the same way as traditional wireline
telephone carriers in the regulatory scheme.57
Wireless telephony is clearly a telecommunications service. Although
classification as a telecommunications service does not carry with it any
content restrictions, it does impose a complex regulatory regime 51 that
could prove detrimental to the growth of the nascent Mobile TV if it were
deemed strictly a wireless telecommunications service. Regardless, Mobile
TV, while relying on mobile telecommunications service networks, cannot
be classified as a telecommunications service because it does not merely
transmit unmanipulated information. Mobile TV uses wireless telecommu-
nications to enable the transmission of interactive and variable content.59
With Mobile TV, the user inputs information, which is transmitted as if it
were normal telecommunications, but then is routed to an Internet Service
53 NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 595-96 (22d ed. 2006) ("Mobile telephone service
is provided from a broadcast point located within [a] range... called a 'cell.' The broadcast
point in turn is connected to the public network so that calls can be completed to or from
any stationary telephone."). Mobile Service is defined under the Communications Act as:
a radio communication service carried on between mobile stations or receivers and
land stations, and by mobile stations communicating among themselves, and includes
(A) both one-way and two-way radio communication services, (B) a mobile service
which provides a regularly interacting group of base, mobile, portable, and associated
control and relay stations (whether licensed on an individual, cooperative, or multiple
basis) for private one-way or two-way land mobile radio communications by eligible
users over designated areas of operation, and (C) any service for which a license is re-
quired in a personal communications service ....
47 U.S.C. § 153(27).
54 JOSEPH A. PECAR & DAVID A. GARBIN, THE New MCGRAW-HILL TELECOM FACTBOOK
20, 140, 614 (McGraw-Hill 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter TELECOM FACTBOOK].
" Id. at 20.
56 See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulver.com's Free World Dialup is
Neither a Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 1 3 (Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Pulver.com Petition].
" See id. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) ("Regulatory treatment of mobile services. (1) Common
carrier treatment of commercial mobile services. (A) A person engaged in the provision of a
service that is a commercial mobile service shall, insofar as such person is so engaged, be
treated as a common carrier for purposes of this chapter .....
58 See § 332(c).
59 See Jennifer LeClaire, Sling Media, Symbian to Bring Moble TV to Smartphones,
TECHNEWSWORLD, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.technewsworld.com (describing television
broadcasts on mobile phones and user ability to record, pause, and rewind live television on
mobile phones); see also Nancy Gohring, Mobile TV Fans Get New Options, PCWORLD,
Oct. 17, 2006, http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,12754 1/printable.html.
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Provider ("ISP") allowing the user of Mobile TV to interconnect with the
Internet.6°
The Internet is a distributed, packet-switched network that encompasses
"the combination of computer facilities and electromagnetic transmission
media, and related equipment and software, comprising the interconnected
worldwide network of computer networks that employ the Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol., 6' A user initiates communication with
a specific site on the Internet to facilitate the exchange of information
much like a user of a telecommunications service dials a number to con-
nect to a specific destination. But these means of initial connection are
where the similarities end.62 Transmission over the Internet is not consid-
ered a telecommunications service because packet-switching alters "form
or content. '' 63 In packet-switching, digital data bits are reassembled at the
final destination in the order in which they arrive.' Unlike a PSTN,
packet-switched networks do not utilize the same transmission route every
time information is exchanged between the same parties.65 Instead, the data
bits are routed through the network in the most efficient path possible. 66
Mobile TV relies on both a packet-switched network for transmission of
information via the Internet, as well as a wireless telephone network to
generate and retrieve content. Accordingly, because the underlying tech-
nology components of Mobile TV are not passive "telecommunications
services" but rather are ones that alter content, Mobile TV itself cannot be
classified as a telecommunication service.
60 Nokia Mobile TV Forum Overview, Mobile TV Vision,
http://www.mobiletv.nokia.comloverview/vision (last visited Nov. 20, 2006); Nokia Mobile
TV Forum, Technology-IP Datacasting, http://mobiletv.nolia.comltechnology/ipdc (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006).
61 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(3).
62 See Susan P. Crawford, Panel V: Responsibility and Liability on the Internet-
Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 700
n. 17 (2005) (explaining the contrast between the Internet and telephone networks).
63 Pulver.com Petition, supra note 56, 1 3-4 (defining 'Internet" and "telecommunica-
tions"); see also Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F.Supp.2d
993, 999-1000 (D.Minn. 2003), affid 394 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2004).
64 TELECOM FACTBOOK, supra note 54, at 249; see also Crawford, supra note 62 at 699-
700 note 17.
65 See LEVEL 3 COMMC'NS, Telecom Regulation and Voice Over IP 3 (Position Paper,
Feb. 16, 2004), [hereinafter Level 3 Position Paper], available at
http://www.level3.comuserimages/dotcompdf/TelecomRegulation andVoiceOverIP.
pdf.
66 Id. (commenting that time and distance are immaterial to an IP network where as
application and bandwidth are of great importance); see also Crawford, supra note 62, at
700 n.17. Packet-switched networks are extremely advantageous when transmitting enor-




B. Mobile TV Cannot Be Classified as a Broadcast Service
As a hybrid technology, Mobile TV service also contains elements simi-
lar to a broadcast service. "Broadcasting" is defined under the Act as "the
dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the pub-
lic, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations. 67 Broadcast signals
are transmitted through the public airwaves and, as a consequence of their
limited and scarce nature, broadcast frequencies are subject to government
regulations.68 The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") has the authority to issue licenses to broadcasters and to
regulate broadcast content "to assure that broadcasters operate in the public
interest."'69 Mobile TV, however, may not be classified as a broadcast ser-
vice subject to this regulatory oversight even though it utilizes airwaves for
wireless transmission of content. Strengthening this assertion, Mobile TV,
unlike broadcast television or radio, is a subscription service that is un-
available to the public at large. Because wireless device users must take
affirmative steps to request and accept content, the public interest demand-
ing broadcast regulation is lessened.7°
C. Mobile TV Cannot Be Classified as a Provider of Cable Video
A cable video service utilizes "one-way transmission to subscribers" to
deliver video content. 7 In other words, cable video service consumers pay
a fee for the ability to receive content; there is no return transmission from
the subscriber. 72 Whereas Mobile TV operates on a subscription or fee-per-
use model, it is unlike cable in that it is an interactive two-way service.
Mobile TV users communicate with the program provider by inputting
information and preferences into the mobile device to indicate content se-
lection, and the provider disburses accordingly.73 Because the service is
two-way, rather than a one-way transmission, Mobile TV is distinguished
from cable service and cannot come under the cable video regulatory re-
gime.
67 47 U.S.C. § 153(6) (2000) (emphasis added).
68 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376, 380, 383, 390 (1969);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,732, 748 (1978).
69 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380; see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 203, 301, 303. See generally In re
Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their December 31, 2004
Broadcast of the Program "Without A Trace," Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture,
21 F.C.C.R. 2732 (Feb. 21, 2006) (explaining that the FCC may prohibit certain broadcast
content pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1464) [hereinafter Notice of Apparent Liability].
70 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 637-640 (1994).
7' 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(A).
72 See generally TV on the Move, supra note 4 (providing a brief overview of Mobile




D. Applicability of the "Information Service" Classification to Mobile TV
Although it encompasses characteristics of telecommunications, broad-
cast, and cable, Mobile TV cannot be categorized as any single one of
these communications services. However, the remaining regulatory classi-
fication, "information service," is appropriate. An information service is:
[T]he offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, process-
ing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and
includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for
the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the man-
agement of a telecommunications service.
74
In general, information services are unlike telecommunications, broad-
cast, and cable services in that they enjoy greater freedom from govern-
mental intrusion.75 Congress provided that information services operate
unfettered by regulations because the services represented a valuable re-
source for the dissemination of information to citizens.76 Moreover, Con-
gress codified its "hands-off' approach, finding that:
The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services avail-
able to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of
educational and informational resources to our citizens .... The Internet and other in-
teractive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a
minimum of government regulation .... 77
Information services now play a valuable role in society by providing a
forum for open political and social discourse as well as entertainment ser-
vices. As such, regulations that could burden these benefits are disfa-
vored.78 Congress 'explicitly elected not to impose common carrier obliga-
tions (regulating content, prices, or access by others) on interactive com-
puter services. '79 Furthermore, the Commission and the courts have deter-
74 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
71 See § 230(b) (codifying U.S. policy to preserve free market economy conditions
in the Internet and other interactive computer services).
76 Id. Pursuant to this section:
It is the policy of the United States-
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use
the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material;....
Id.
7 § 230(a)(1), (4).
71 § 230(a)(3)-(4).
79 Crawford, supra note 62, at 704-05.
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mined that the Internet falls within the information service category," ° and
thus services which utilize the Internet for transmission should also be
classified as information services.
1. Vonage Holdings Corporation v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
In 2004, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the offerings of Vonage
Holdings Corporation should be classified as a "telecommunications ser-
vice" under the 1996 Act.8' Vonage provides an IP-enabled service that
permits voice communications over an Internet connection via technology
known as Voice over Internet Protocol ("VolP"). 82 In evaluating the issue
of telecommunications classification, the court examined the mechanics of
VoP technology. Essentially, VolP uses a packet-switched network rather
than the traditional, point-to-point PSTN circuit-switched network to
transmit voice calls. 83 To place a call, a VoIP customer uses special com-
puter premises equipment that formats his voice communication into pack-
ets of bits. 8 These packets are then transmitted over the Internet to the
destination. 5 Vonage provides only the technology for the VolP service; a
third party provides the broadband ISP service. 6 When a VolIP customer
places a phone call, the ISP service must distinguish whether the destina-
tion is to a PSTN customer or a VolP customer.87 The ISP then routes the
packets accordingly to connect the call.8
The court examined Congressional findings to aid in analyzing the ap-
propriate classification of VoW service.89 The court juxtaposed "basic ser-
vices" and "information services" under the 1996 Act.90 During the draft-
ing of the 1996 Act, Congress envisioned a time when computer-based
80 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs. (Brand X), 125 S.
Ct. 2688 (2005) (holding that the FCC's conclusion that broadband services should be
subject to minimal regulation was not arbitrary or capricious); Vonage Holdings Corp. v.
Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F.Supp.2d 993 (D.Minn. 2003), affd 394 F.3d 568
(8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that VolP service is an information service because it has the
capacity to generate, store, transform, process, retrieve, utilize, and make information ac-
cessible via telecommunications); Pulver.com Petition, supra note 56 (explaining that the
FCC determines peer-to-peer VolP service is classified as an information service).
81 See Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d 993.
82 Id. at 993-99.
83 Id. at 995 (citing Chdrie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation On The Horizon:





87 Id. at 995.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 997.
90 Id. at 997-98. Prior to the 1996 Act, information services were known as "enhanced
services." Id. at 998.
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services would integrate with traditional methods of communication.91 A
"basic common carrier," such as a traditional telephone service provider,
offers communications limited to the linear movement of information.92 By
contrast, information services "combine[] basic service with computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or
similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information. 93 The court held that the
technological composition of the service and the legislative history sup-
ported the proposition that Vonage's VoIP service should not fall under the
category of telecommunications. 94 "[T]he VolP service provided by
Vonage constitutes an information service because it offers the 'capability
for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications.'
95
2. In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulver.com's Free
World Dialup is Neither a Telecommunications nor a Telecommunications
Service: Memorandum Opinion and Order
Shortly after the Eighth Circuit decided that Vonage's VoIP service was
an information service, the FCC considered whether a peer-to-peer VolP
service should be treated similarly. 96 Pulver.com's Free World Dialup ser-
vice ("FWD") was an exclusively peer-to-peer VolP service, meaning that
the sevice did not connect to the PSTN network.9 7 The Memorandum
Opinion and Order was significant because it established for the first time
that VoP would be regulated by the FCC as an information service rather
than a telecommunications service.
A critical factor underpinning the Commission's decision to declare
peer-to-peer VoP an information service was that Pulver.com did not offer
a transmission service; FWD was enabled through a computer software
application that allowed users to connect to each other via existing Internet
connections.98 "Transmission" is at the heart of the definition of "telecom-
91 Id.
92 Id. at 997-98 n.2 ("[W]e adopt a regulatory scheme that distinguishes between the
common carrier offering of basic transmission services and the offering of enhanced ser-
vices .. " (quoting In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384 at 5 (1980)).
9' Id. at 998.
94 Id. at 998-99.
95 Id. at 999 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000)).
96 Pulver.com Petition, supra note 56.
97 Id. 1 4-7 (explaining that Pulver.com's FWD service is dependent upon its members




munications" under the 1996 Act. 99 FWD did not offer the transmission
component integral to meet the definition of "telecommunications" under
the 1996 Act because its users had to "'bring their own broadband' trans-
mission to interact with the FWD server."' Some commentators argued
that because FWD connected to the Internet "via some form of transmis-
sion" it should qualify as a telecommunications service.10 1 The Commis-
sion rejected this argument, concluding that "Pulver may 'use' some tele-
communications to provide its FWD directory service but that does not
make FWD itself telecommunications." 10 2 Accordingly, the lack of trans-
mission service disqualified FWD as either telecommunications or a tele-
communications service provider.
10 3
Additionally, the Commission determined that FWD further deviated
from the definition of telecommunications because it did not always trans-
mit "information of the user's choosing without change in the form or con-
tent of the information as sent and received." 10" Instead, because FWD
provided new information to the customer by informing them when other
members are "present" online and by providing voicemail and email re-
sponses,10 5 the Commission concluded that FWD satisfied the criteria to
qualify as an "information service." 6
3. National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet
Services
In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Inter-
net Services (Brand X), the Supreme Court held that broadband Internet
service provided by cable operators does not constitute "telecommunica-
tions" under the 1996 Act,10 7 affirming the FCC's determination. 108 Broad-
99 Id.; see also supra discussion Part III.A.
100 Pulver.com Petition, supra note 56, 9.
101 Id.
102 Id.
'0' Id. at 9-10.
"o4 Id. at 9.
105 Id. The Commission summarized these features as "computing capabilities." Id. at
11.
106 Id. The Commission found that because FWD offered "'a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available in-
formation via telecommunications."' it was deemed to be an information service, not a
telecommunications service. Id. (quoting the 1996 Telecommunications Act definition of an
information service, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000)).
107 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs. (Brand X), 125 S. Ct.
2688 (2005).
108 Id. at 2695; see In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over
Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regu-
latory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declara-
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band Internet service consists of two core services: cable modem service
and Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL"). Cable modem service utilizes cable
video lines owned by the cable company to transmit IP-enabled content
between customers' computers and the Internet."°9 DSL service is provided
by local telephone companies and allows high-speed, or "broadband," ac-
cess to the Internet using a network of telephone lines owned by the tele-
phone company. 10 The cable operator or the telephone service provider
itself can operate as the ISP, "or [they] can lease [their] transmission facili-
ties to independent ISPs that then use the facilities to provide consumers
with Internet access.""'1 These third party entities are called "non-facilities
based ISPs" because they do not own their own infrastructure, but rather
they utilize the existing cable or telephone networks and integrate their
own technology onto the existing hardware to enable connection to the
Internet.'12
In the 2002 Declaratory Ruling & NPRM discussed in Brand X, the
Commission determined that cable modem broadband provision was an
information service per the 1996 Act. 13 This determination was upheld by
the Court which found that the Commission acted reasonably when it de-
termined not to treat broadband Internet providers differently than non-
facilities-based ISPs. 1 14 The Court's decision was based, in part, upon the
fact that the two services were analogous. Broadband Internet providers
and ISPs offer "a single, integrated service that enables the subscriber to
utilize Internet access . . . [and] Internet access provides a capability for
manipulating and storing information .. ,,5 Broadband Internet service
does not offer the end user a telecommunications service, but rather utilizes
existing telecommunications infrastructure as a conduit to transmit infor-
tory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 7 (Mar. 14, 2002)
[hereinafter Declaratory Ruling & NPRM].
'09 BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2696.
110 Id. (citing WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (explaining
DSL technology).
.. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2696. The Court recognized that broadband Internet service
was not limited to cable modem or DSL service and that there were emerging technologies
that provided high-speed Internet service to homes "including terrestrial- and satellite-
based wireless networks." Id. (quoting Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, supra note 108, 6
112 Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2697-98 (citations omitted).
113 Declaratory Ruling & NPRM, supra note 108, 7.
114 BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2698, 2708; see also Pulver.com Petition, supra note 56, 11.
Non-Facilities base ISPs are considered information services under the 1996 Act. See
Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F.Supp.2d 993 (D.Minn.
2003), affd 394 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2004).
.. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2698 (discussing the Commission's rationale for treating
broadband service providers and non-facilities based ISPs similarly in Declaratory Ruling
& NPRM, supra note 108, 38).
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mation.116 Accordingly, because broadband Internet service closely resem-
bled the service of non-facilities based ISPs which were classified as in-
formation services, the Court held that the two should be treated under the
same regulatory scheme. 1
7
4. Mobile TV is Most Appropriately Classified as an Information Service
Mobile TV service is analogous to other hybrid communications tech-
nologies which are classified as information services under the 1996
Act. 18 Like VolP and broadband Internet services, Mobile TV does not act
as a transmission service, but instead utilizes telecommunications to con-
vey Internet content. Additionally, Mobile TV content is altered during the
transmission process, a characteristic antithetical to the statutory require-
ment that telecommunications be transmitted from source to destination
without alteration in form or content.119 Furthermore, the user of a tele-
communications service specifies the path by which information must
flow, whereas Mobile TV relies on dynamic routing across a packet-
switched network. 120 Once the packets leave the user's computer, they are
distributed according to efficiency of transport and, although the user may
send the same information multiple times, he has no control over the path
that content travels.' 21 For these reasons, Mobile TV is not a telecommuni-
cation service itself, but rather a conduit over which information and con-
tent flows. Because Mobile TV works in a manner analogous to VolP and
other IP-enabled services, it too should be classified as an information ser-
vice.
116 BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2716.
117 The Court afforded the FCC deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron stands for the proposition that when
there is statutory ambiguity and an agency reasonably interprets the meaning of the ambigu-
ity by powers within its jurisdiction, the court must grant deference to the interpretation so
long as the agency's decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Id. at 844.
1.8 See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2716 ("Since ... the broad-band connection between
the customer's computer and the cable company's computer-processing facilities [are]
downstream from the computer-processing facilities, there is no question that it merely
serves as a conduit for the information services that have already been 'reassembled' by the
cable company in its capacity as ISP."); see also Vonage, 290 F.Supp.2d at 999 ("[T]his
Court finds that Vonage uses telecommunications services, rather than provides them");
Pulver.com Petition, supra note 56 11 ("[The Commission] declare[s] that FWD is neither
"telecommunications" nor "telecommunications service" as defined in the Act and as inter-
preted by the Commission.").
"9 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).




IV. CONTENT REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE
GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST VERSUS PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND
CONSUMER INTEREST
Both Congress and the Commission have recently been pushing a crack
down on indecency. Since the 2004 Super Bowl Halftime show where
Janet Jackson had her now infamous "wardrobe malfunction,"1 22 the Gov-
ernment has taken a stricter stance on content that could rise to the level of
indecency. VIACOMM was sanctioned an aggregate amount of $550,000
($32,000 for each of its directly owned stations) for broadcasting a per-
formance in which only 19/32 of a second actually depicted a portion of
Ms. Jackson's bare breast. 23 At the time, this was the highest penalty that
was ever issued against a broadcaster. In March of the same year, the
Commission reversed the Enforcement Bureau and determined that an ex-
cited utterance by Bono when he won an honor at the 2003 Golden Globes
Award Show rose to the level of indecency.' 24 Since then, the Commission
has used these decisions to create a stricter precedent when evaluating
whether broadcast material is indecent. 125 The Commission's power to
sanctioning power was given teeth in June 2006 when President George W.
Bush signed into effect the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act which
raised the minimum penalty for broadcasting indecency to $325,000 per
station.
12 6
The trend toward stricter content regulation is not limited to broadcast,
but is permeating into other areas as well. Chairman Martin has been a
forceful advocate of "Family Friendly" tiers of programming compelling
cable and satellite providers to voluntarily accept such Commission sug-
gestions or risk enhanced governmental scrutiny. 127 The strategy worked
122 In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their February 1,
2004, Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Notice of Apparent Liability
for Forfeiture, 19 F.C.C.R. 19230 (Aug. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Super Bowl NALI (aff d In
re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their February 1, 2004,
Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show, Order on Reconsideration, 21
F.C.C.R. 6653 (May 4, 2006)).
123 Id. at 13.
124 In re Complaints Against Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
4926 (Mar. 3, 2004) (finding that Bono's use of the "F-word" was qualified as indecent
language).
1 2See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2,
2002 and March 8, 2005, Notices of Apparent Liability and Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664 (Feb. 21, 2006).
126 Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-235, 120 Stat 491 (2006) (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)).
127 In September 2006, the cable and satellite industry collectively agreed to offer "fam-
ily friendly" tiers which consist of programming suitable for audiences of all ages. Adam
Thierer commented to Michael Scherer of Salon.com, "[t]here is an element of regulatory
extortion at work here, everybody in town knows that." Michael Scherer, Sex, drugs and
[Vol. 15
Regulating Mobile TV
and in September 2006, cable and satellite providers agreed to begin offer-
ing these tiers of service within the next year. Using a similar strategy, in
October 2006, Commissioner McDowell warned members of the media
that the FCC was watching their actions and that "[i]n the absence of self
regulation, government-mandated regulation is sure to fill the vacuum."' 128
Congressional and regulatory action has been applauded by various con-
sumer groups such as the American Family Association, 29 Concerned
Women for America, 130 and the Parents Television Council. 13' These recent
events are indicia that there will likely be calls to regulate indecent Mobile
TV content as they mark a pattern of regulatory conservatism.
A. Obscene Material is Not Afforded First Amendment Protections
The First Amendment to the Constitution states, "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."' 132 The FCC, as an adminis-
trative agency and thereby an extension of Congressional authority, is pro-
hibited generally by the First Amendment from regulating content such
that can be construed as abridging speech, and is specifically prohibited
from censoring program content pursuant to Section 326 of the Communi-
cations Act. 133 However, there are certain types of speech that can be regu-
cable TV, http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2OO5/12/12/cable; see also FCC Warns
Cable, Satellite: Clean Up TV Raunch, FOX NEWS.COM, Nov. 29, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/0,3566,177055,00.html.
128 John Eggerton, McDowell Offers Content-Reg Carrot/Stick, BROADCASTING & CA-
BLE, Oct. 16, 2006,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articlelD=CA6381706.
1 The American Family Association is a conservative group that "believes that the
entertainment industry, through its various products, has played a major role in the decline
of those values on which our country was founded and which keep a society and its families
strong and healthy." AFA General Information, http://www.afa.net/about.asp (last visited
Nov. 11, 2006). See Jody Brown, Bush's Pen Strengthens FCC's Teeth in Enforcing De-
cency, AGAPEPRESS (Jun. 15, 2006), http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/6/152006e.asp
(stating that the AFA strongly supported the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act).
130 Press Release, Concerned Women For America, CWALAC Calls on Senate Com-
merce Committee to Act on Indecency Legislation Immediately (Jan. 18, 2006), available
at http://www.cwfa.org/articles/993l/MEDIA/family/index.htm.
131 See Cable Consumer Choice Campaign,
http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/cable/main.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (listing the or-
ganizations current campaigns to afford consumers family-friendly tiered programming for
cable service).
132 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'13 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000) which states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any ra-
dio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Com-





lated without infringing Constitutional guarantees. Obscene material is not
entitled to any protection under the First Amendment, and the dissemina-
tion of such material constitutes a criminal offense."3 By law, the dissemi-
nation of "any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio
communication" is strictly prohibited.
1 35
The Supreme Court set forth a three-prong test in Miller v. California to
determine whether material is obscene. 136 The trier of fact must determine:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
137
Although the Miller test can be applied to any material made available
for public view, the test has most frequently been invoked for material
which involves or depicts sexual conduct.1 38 While not all sexually explicit
material is classified as obscene, the Court indicated that "hard core" por-
nography is not entitled to First Amendment protection. 139 Yet, classifying
the type of material that rises to the level of obscenity is challenging; "[t]he
problem is ... that one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene
until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure stan-
dards, have pronounced it so."'4 Moreover, the Court has held some mate-
rial to be obscene when viewed by children, while only rising to the level
of indecency when viewed by adults.
141
134 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973): FCC, Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity
Frequently Asked Questions (last visited Nov. 11, 2006),
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html#TheLaw [hereinafter FCC FAQs] (citing 18 U.S.C.
1464 (2000)).
135 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
136 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
137 Id. (citations omitted).
138 See id.; cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). It is noteworthy that Justice
Stewart only nine years earlier in Jacobellis declared that hard core pornography was best
categorized as obscene, yet in Miller he joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion which
asserted that the lines between the variances of the genre were too blurred to make an accu-
rate distinction. In this regard, he recanted his initial proposition in favor of granting more
First Amendment protection to certain types of pornography. Miller, 413 U.S. at 26. The
majority opinion states that Justice Brennan "has abandoned his former position and now
maintains that no formulation of this Court, the Congress, or the States can adequately
distinguish obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment from protected expres-
sion." Id. at 27; see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69-70 (1973).
139 Miller, 413 U.S. at 29 ("[T]his Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate
'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment.").
140 Id. (quoting Paris Adult Theatre , 413 U.S. at 93); see also Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at
197 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I imply no criticism of the Court, which in those cases was
faced with the task of trying to define [obscenity, which] may be indefinable.").
141 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968). In Ginsberg, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a New York statute than prohibited the sale of material to children under
17 years of age if it could be deemed obscene for children, even if it was not considered to
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B. Indecent Material is Protected by the First Amendment
Unlike obscene material, indecent speech is protected under the First
Amendment, 142 but is subject to enhanced or diminished Constitutional
protection depending upon a variety of factors, including the method of
communication. 43 In FCC v. Pacifica, the Supreme Court set forth the
standard for indecency, holding that material is indecent if it is "patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards ... [and depicts] sexual
or excretory activities and organs at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience."' 44 While indecency embodies characteris-
tics of obscenity, no singular aspect of the indecency test is dispositive. 4'
Instead, the context in which the material arises is critically evaluated to
determine whether it rises to the level of indecency. 4
6
Traditionally, the FCC has greater latitude when regulating to protect
children in broadcast material as compared with other forms of communi-
cation.'47 Accordingly, when the Commission seeks to limit content, it
must strike an appropriate balance between protecting children on one
hand, and enabling a free and open forum for the communication of ideas
on the other. 48 In order to achieve this balance, the purpose of any restric-
tive regulation must be explicit and its language must be narrowly drawn to
achieve the desired end.
4 1
be obscene to adults. Id. at 634. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that "the
scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material
concerned with sex cannot be made to depend on whether the citizen is an adult or a mi-
nor." Id. at 636; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (reaffirming the Gins-
berg rationale).
14 Reno, 521 U.S. at 874-75; see also Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989).
143 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978).
144 Id. at 732. Although the Pacifica involved broadcast media, the criteria have been
used as a guidepost in subsequent cases involving other communications media. See, e.g.,
Reno, 521 U.S. at 566-67 (finding portions of the Communications Decency Act were
content-based blanket restrictions on speech); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (distinguishing between cable systems which have the capacity to
block unwanted television channels on a household-by-household basis); Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004) (holding that the Child Online Protection Act burdens
speech on the Internet).
141 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741.
146 Whether or not material is "patently offensive" depends on context, degree, and time
of the broadcast. See FCC Fact Sheet on Cable Program Content Regulations,
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/program.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) [hereinafter FCC
Fact Sheet].
147 See generally Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consor-
tium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Playboy, 529 U.S. 803.
148 See Notice of Apparent Liability, supra note 69, 1 3.
149 See id. ("'Broadcast material that is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment; the FCC may regulate such material only with due respect for the high value
our Constitution places on freedom and choice in what people may say and hear... [and
any] potential chilling effect of the FCC's generic definition of indecency will be tempered
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C. First Amendment Analysis Varies with the Medium.
As discussed above, the method of content transmission dictates the
regulatory scheme. Communications media are subject to varying regula-
tory treatment depending on the type of technology employed and the de-
gree of accessibility that technology affords to the public. Broadcasting
necessarily involves spectrum, which is considered a finite natural and
public resource. By its public nature, broadcasting provides ubiquitous
accessibility to anyone with a receiver such as a television or radio.' 50 The
pervasive nature of broadcast service, combined with its universal avail-
ability, provides a legitimate rationale for greater governmental restrictions
on content transmitted via the broadcast medium.' 5' Cable service, on the
other hand, requires the consumer to establish a voluntary relationship with
the cable provider to permit the physical installation and the initiation of
the subscription service for the content delivery. 52 In the past, cable pro-
viders were subjected to a regulatory "middle ground" wherein content
could be regulated, but to a lesser extent than broadcasters. 53 However,
recent Supreme Court decisions have raised the level of judicial scrutiny,
affording cable operators and content providers greater First Amendment
protections. 154
By contrast, the Internet is subject to less governmental intrusion in the
form of content regulation than other forms of media because it is classi-
fied as an information service. 155 Likewise, telephony has traditionally
been viewed as a conduit for the transmission of content rather than as a
by the Commission's restrained enforcement policy." (quoting Action for Children's Tele-
vision v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1344, 1340 n. 14 (1988))).
150 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
151 See id. Compare id. and In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, Notices of Apparent Liability and Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2730 (Feb. 21, 2006) (Commissioner Deborah
Taylor Tate) ("One of the bedrock principles of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, is that the airwaves belong to the public. Much like public spaces and national
landmarks, these are scarce and finite resources that must be preserved for the benefit of all
Americans."). See generally Sable, 492 U.S. 115 (distinguishing broadcast media from
Dial-a-Porn); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969) (noting that
broadcast frequencies are considered a scarce resource which justifies their regulation by
the government).
152 See generally Playboy, 529 U.S. 803.
153 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180, 224-25 (1997) (holding that "must
carry" requirements are constitutionally valid); see also 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2) (2000) (stat-
ing that cable operators themselves are prohibited from editorializing program content);
Denver Area Educ. Telecosmms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741 (1996).
154 See discussion infra Part IV.D.3 (discussing the trend of stricter scrutiny in reviewing
restrictions).
15 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004); Play-
boy, 529 U.S. at 813-14; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).
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pervasive communication medium like broadcast or cable. 156 Because these
four media are treated differently under the 1996 Act, content that may be
considered indecent for broadcast purposes may be deemed appropriate for
either cable or the Internet.
D. Mobile TV Regulation will be Guided by the Permissible Regulations
of Its Underlying Components
1. First Amendment in Broadcast Media: Government has Broader Discre-
tion to Regulate Certain Types of Content
The FCC has generally been entitled to greater latitude to regulate broad-
cast speech because of the scarcity of spectrum and the corresponding gov-
ernment interest in managing this natural resource for the public.'57 The
FCC transfers its duty as a public fiduciary to the broadcaster when it
grants a broadcast license. 5 ' In exchange for the license, the broadcaster
owes a duty to the public to create programming that is properly tailored to
all segments of society.1"9
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that the
FCC had the authority to require broadcasters to provide equal airtime to
political opponents. 6 ° The Court's decision rested upon two premises. 6'
First, the Court reasoned that broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource
and, as such, they are subject to greater regulation in a manner responsive
to the public "convenience, interest, or necessity."'162 Second, with regard
to the First Amendment, the Court declared, "the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters .... is paramount .... It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance mo-
nopolization of that market" whether by the government or by a private
156 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
157 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Turner, 512 U.S.
at 637-38.
158 Turner!, 512 U.S. at 650.
159 See id. at 650-51 (discussing the duty to the public).
16o See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01. The "equal time" requirement has since been
repealed. See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Re-
port, 101 F.C.C. 2d 145, 5 (Aug. 7, 1985) ("[W]e no longer believe that the fairness doc-
trine ... serves the public interest."). However, the First Amendment and the public interest
with regard to the airwaves analysis remains a cornerstone of content regulation jurispru-
dence. See e.g. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 622;
Sable, 492 U.S. 115.
161 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377, 390, 394.
162 Id. at 376-77.
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licensee. 163 Red Lion has been a cornerstone in subsequent FCC regulations
of First Amendment issues, bolstering the Commission's authority to regu-
late certain types of broadcast content by diminishing the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that the Court will impose upon such action.
The holding of Red Lion was reaffirmed in FCC v. Pacifica and extended
to support the Commission's regulation of an indecent radio broadcast.'
64
At two-o-clock in the afternoon, a Pacifica Foundation radio station in the
New York area broadcast a pre-recorded monologue by comedian and sati-
rist George Carlin entitled, "Filthy Words."'165 In this monologue, Carlin
repeatedly used profanity and made references to sexual and excretory
activities and organs. 166 The Commission determined that the monologue
was indecent and could have warranted sanctions against Pacifica.167 Criti-
cal to the Commission's determination was the deliberate repetitive nature
of the words, the activities that they described, and the fact that children
would likely be in the audience because the monologue was aired in the
middle of the afternoon. 68 In sum, the culmination of these qualities made
the monologue patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards.1
69
The Court determined that indecent content was entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, yet it imposed a reduced level of judicial scrutiny due to
the unique nature of broadcast media. 70 One key factor pivotal to the
Court's decision was the idea that radio broadcast was pervasive and lis-
teners were a captive audience. 7 ' The Court reasoned that while the broad-
caster had given a warning prior to airing the monologue, if a listener tuned
163 Id. at 390.
164 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742.
165 Id. at 729-30.
166 Id. at 732 (quoting In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station
WBAI (FM), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 11 (Feb. 12, 1975)).
167 Id. at 730.
168 Id. at 732. The Commission described the language in the monologue as "'patently
offensive," and asked the Court to approve the regulation of such content by "principles
analogous to those found in the law of nuisance where the law generally speaks to channel-
ing behavior more than actually prohibiting it." Id. at 731-32 (internal quotations and cita-
tion omitted).
169 Id. at 732.
170 Id. at 738 (looking to the legislative history, the Court ultimately determined that
there was significant traditional support that Congress intended that obscene and indecent
language.) "Respect for that intent requires that the censorship language be read as inappli-
cable to the prohibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language." Id. at 737-
38.
' Id. at 748-49. Cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (holding that the "cap-
tive audience" rationale was inapplicable to a situation where a man wore a shirt with the
words "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned upon it. The Court reasoned that onlookers could avert
their eyes if they were offended by Cohen's shirt, thereby remedying the situation them-
selves.) Id. at 21.
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in mid-broadcast, they would still be subject to the indecent speech.'72 In
this way, prior warnings were impracticable, if not impossible, to ensure
that unwilling listeners would not be in the audience.'73 The damage was
done the moment that an unwilling listener heard the broadcast. 174
Another key factor in the Court's decision was the Commission's overall
goal of protecting children from indecent material. 75 The Court reasoned
that when the government acts to restrict content, it must be done in the
least restrictive means possible to achieve the desired end. 76 In this case,
the Court held that the FCC's purpose was legitimate and its corresponding
action was reasonable since the limitations imposed on broadcasters were
limited to certain hours of the day when children were likely to be listen-
ing.'77 Pacifica granted the FCC the authority to regulate the broadcast of
indecent speech and to impose temporal limitations on content to protect
children.
78
2. Indecent Phone Messages Over Telephone Service
While the Court in Pacifica supported FCC restrictions on broadcast
content, the Court has been less sympathetic of restrictions on content de-
livered by other media. In Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court re-
jected the Commission's attempt to enforce a statute that completely
banned sexually indecent and obscene phone messages called "dial-a-
porn.' 179 At issue was whether Congress was empowered to amend § 223
of the Communications Act to prohibit the transmission of sexually inde-
cent and obscene telephonic communications.' 80 Although the Court up-
held the statue insofar as it applied to obscene messages, 8' it struck down
the statute as applied to indecent messages. 82 Critical to the Court's deci-
sion was the fact that the statute posed a complete, rather than partial, pro-
scription of indecent speech. 83 Again the Court emphasized that the gov-
172 Pacifica, 238 U.S. at 748.
173 Id. at 758-59 (Powell, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 748-49 (majority opinion).
175 Id. at 749-50.
176 Id. at 757-58 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining how narrowly tailored restrictions
are allowable in order to protect children from particular harmful conduct).
117 Id. at 758-59.
178 Id. at 749-50 (majority opinion).
179 Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131, 124 n.4 (1989) (explaining
the ban of interstate dial-a-porn messages).
180 Sable, 492 U.S. at 124.
181 Id. The Court agreed with the district court, which upheld the statute insofar as it
prohibited obscene telephone messages, stating that "the protection of the First Amendment
does not extend to obscene speech." Id. (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
69 (1973).




ernment may regulate otherwise protected speech only if it chooses the
least restrictive means to achieve its objective.'84 The Court found that the
Commission's attempt to completely ban the phone sex messages was
"contrary to the First Amendment."'85 The FCC's position made it "illegal
for adults as well as children to have access to the sexually explicit mes-
sages" and thus was overly broad.
186
The Count distinguished its holding in Sable from that in Pacifica by
stating that "the government may not reduce the adult population.., to...
only what is fit for children."' 87 In applying strict scrutiny, the Court fur-
ther distinguished Sable from Pacifica, reasoning that, even if § 223(b)
was narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose of protecting children, the
transmission of dial-a-porn was inherently different than broadcast radio. 88
Specifically, dial-a-porn requires affirmative steps by the individual to
access the content. 189 The individual must physically pick up the phone,
dial a certain number, and pay a fee to hear the message.' 90 Conversely,
broadcast is "uniquely pervasive" and the content can be easily accessed
by adults and children without warning.' 9' The Supreme Court noted that
"[u]nlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message re-
ceived by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive
or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure
to it.' 92 The Court held that the "captive audience" problem found in
Pacifica was not applicable in the dial-a-porn situation because "callers
will generally not be unwilling listeners.
'193
3. Judicial Review of Restrictions on Cable Services
The Court has extended First Amendment protection to cable program-
mers and cable operators because they are engaged in the transmission of
184 Id.
185 Id. ("The Government may serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny, 'it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those inter-
ests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms") (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980) ("It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means
must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.")).
186 Sable, 492 U.S. at 123, 131.
187 Id. at 128 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)) (internal quotations
omitted).
188 Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 128.
191 Id. at 127 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-749 (1978)).




speech.'94 However, unlike broadcast, the Court initially declined to extend
strict scrutiny review to content regulation via cable service,'95 instead fa-
voring an intermediate level of judicial review. 196 This was due in large
part to the structure of cable content transmission which distinguished it
from other forms of media.1
97
a. Turner I and H
In 1994, cable operators and programmers challenged the constitutional-
ity of the "must-carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Pro-
tection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"), as well as the
FCC's authority to impose content-based regulations on the cable industry,
in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC ("Turner /,).'98 The 1992 Cable Act was
enacted in response to the refusal of many cable operators to provide
broadcasting content to their subscribers' 9 To correct what was seen as a
competitive imbalance in the market between cable operators and broad-
casters, Congress enacted legislation mandating cable carriage of local
broadcasting content.2°° The cable industry sued on grounds that these
"must-carry" requirements violated operators' First Amendment rights to
transmit speech of their choosing, and challenged the FCC's imposition of
specific regulations to achieve that end.2°'
The Court began its analysis by noting that not all governmental interfer-
ence with speech dictates the same level of judicial review.2 °2 Here, the
Court distinguished cable service from broadcast, specifically stating that it
did not suffer from the same "unique physical limitations of the broadcast
medium," and, therefore, the government was not entitled to the level of
deference afforded in broadcast content restrictions.0 3 The Court also re-
jected the cable industry's contention that the must-carry provisions trig-
194 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (citing Leathers
v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991)).
195 See Turner , 512 U.S. at 637, 661-62. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC
(Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
19 Turner, 512 U.S. at 661-62.
'9' Id. at 639.
'9' Id. at 630.
'99 Id. at 630-33.
200 Id. at 633.
20l Id. at 626.
202 Id. at 637.
203 Id. The Court specifically distinguished cable from broadcast because it did not deal
with limited spectrum frequencies, as cable wire and fiber optic transmission combined
with digital compression technology was making it increasingly more likely for an unlim-
ited number of speakers to communicate via the same route. Additionally, there was little
risk of interference between programmers because each was allocated a specific channel per
the cable operator. Id. at 639.
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gered a strict scrutiny review which would justify the regulation only if it
was narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest and did
not favor one set of speakers over another.2" Instead, the Court focused on
the unique characteristics of the cable medium in which cable operators
enjoyed a bottleneck monopoly, permitting them the power to choose the
programming content that they deemed to be most economically beneficial
rather than the one most beneficial to the marketplace of ideas.205 The
Court reasoned that this power severely threatened the viability of the
broadcasting industry, and such a concern constituted a legitimate govern-
ment interest.206
The Court noted that a content-neutral regulation will be upheld and is
entitled to an intermediate level of review, if "it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free speech; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest."207 The Court found the must-carry obligations to
be constitutionally valid provided that the Government could support such
a law with quantifiable data to demonstrate its legitimacy, and that the
Government could prove that these obligations would not "burden substan-
tially more speech than necessary to further those interests. 2 8
In Turner Broadcast Systems, Inc. v. FCC (Turner H), the Court again
considered must-carry provisions, this time with regard to the specific
means mandated by the statute.209 The Court upheld its finding that Con-
gress had a legitimate government interest and that must-carry provisions
were indeed necessary to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the cable
industry20 and to protect television broadcasters' economic viability.211 In
Turner II, the Court evaluated whether the must-carry provisions con-
strained speech within the cable medium more than necessary to achieve
204 Id. at 653, 657. The cable industry argued that "a regulation is presumed invalid
under the First Amendment because the government may not 'restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others."' Id. at 657 (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). The Court went on to say that such a proposition is
only sustainable when the speaker-based law "reflect[s] the Government's preference for
the substance of what the favored speakers have to say . . ." Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 658 (cit-
ing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983).
205 Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 661.
206 Id. at 660-61
207 Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (internal quotations
omitted)).
208 Turner!, 512 U.S. at 662 (internal citations omitted).
209 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner!1), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
210 Id. at 196, 203-04, 213.
211 Id. at 208, 213 ("We think it apparent must-carry serves the Government's interests
'in a direct and effective way.' Must-carry ensures that a number of local broadcasters
retain cable carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising revenues needed
to support a multiplicity of stations.").
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the legitimate government objective.212 The Court held that must-carry
obligations were a reasonable solution to the problem because "Congress
took steps to confine the breadth and burden of the regulatory scheme,
' 213
and, although the Court recognized that there were other theoretical alter-
natives to the must-carry requirements, "[o]ur precedents establish that
when evaluating a content-neutral regulation which incidentally burdens
speech, we will not invalidate the preferred remedial scheme because some
alternative solution is marginally less intrusive on a speaker's First
Amendment interests. 2 4
b. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC
In addition to the competitive concerns between the cable industry and
broadcast, the 1992 Cable Act addressed the issue of indecent program-
ming. Section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act imposed constraints on the provi-
sion of indecent programming over cable networks in order to protect chil-
dren from viewing sexually graphic material.215 The first subsection, §
10(a), permitted the cable operator autonomy to elect (or refuse) to broad-
cast programs that "[it] reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured
by contemporary community standards. 216 The second and third subsec-
tions of § 10, however, required the cable operator to, at a minimum, seg-
regate and block indecent programming.2 7
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, the Court held that mandating cable operators to isolate and block
indecent material constituted an unjustifiable content-based restriction on
speech in violation of the First Amendment.218 As in Turner I and Turner
II, the Court ultimately determined that the appropriate level of review was
a heightened intermediate standard rather than a diminished level for
broadcast or the strict scrutiny of telephony. This decision was based
212 Id. at 213-14.
213 Id. at 216.
214 Id. at 216-18. Justice O'Connor in her dissent argued that the must-carry provisions
were wholly at odds with the Courts prior decision in Turner I which stated that the obliga-
tions were "a means of preserving 'access to free television programming whatever its
content,"' because the organic law favored some speech over others. Due to this fact, Jus-
tice O'Conner argued that the statute should be reviewed under strict scrutiny which, in her
opinion, it would necessarily fail. Id. at 234-35.
215 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 728 (1996).
216 Id. at 734 (quoting the 1992 Cable Act, 102 P.L. 385, 106 Stat. 1486, § 10(a)(2)).
217 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-358 §10, 106 Stat. 1460, 1485-86 (1992).
218 Denver Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727.
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largely on the flexibility that the language of § 10(a) embodied,21 9 which
the Court determined struck an appropriate balance between the competing
interests of the government's desire to protect children, the cable industry's
right to broadcast certain types of content, and the consumer's right to re-
ceive such programming. 220 However this sentiment was short lived, and
only three years after deciding Denver Telecommunications Consortium,
the Court determined that content-based speech restrictions for cable
should be evaluated under the strictest scrutiny.
c. U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment
In reaction to the litigation over indecency regulation of cable program-
ming, Congress included in the 1996 Telecommunications Act more spe-
cific language to address indecent programming and "signal bleed" on ca-
ble networks.22' Section 505 of the 1996 Act required that cable operators
either "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" channels primarily dedi-
cated to sexually-oriented programming, or to limit their transmission to
hours when children were unlikely in the viewing audience "so that only
paying customers had access to certain programs. 222 In addition, § 505
required that cable operators fully scramble sexually indecent program-
ming in a way that eliminated "signal bleed. '223 "Signal bleed" is the phe-
nomenon by which the scrambling process does not fully disguise all im-
ages and sounds.224 The goal of § 505 was to guard children from exposure
to sounds or images resulting from signal bleed, yet the statute targeted
only sexually-oriented programming. 225 If a programmer was found to be
in violation of section 505, the programmer was subject to sanctions.226
The result was that many programmers only allowed customers access to
the material between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., pursuant to the time-channeling
criteria set forth in Pacifica.227
Cable programmer Playboy Entertainment challenged the "signal bleed"
requirement of the 1996 Act, arguing that the regulation violated the First
Amendment because § 505 targeted only sexually-explicit content, and
219 Id. at 755-56.
220 Id. at 747.
221 United States v. Playboy Entm't. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000).
222 Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 505, repealed 2000). "The purpose of § 505 is to shield




225 Id. Section 505 "'focuses only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that
speech has on its listeners'. . . [tihis is the essence of content-based regulation." Id. at 811-
812 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (opinion of O'Connor, J.)).
226 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 805.
227 Id. at 806-07.
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"focus[ed] only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that
speech ha[d] on its listeners. 228 Playboy argued that the statue imposed
content restrictions on speech both facially and in effect because applica-
tion of § 505 resulted in a "significant restriction of communication, with a
corresponding reduction in Playboy's revenues., 229 Furthermore, Playboy
argued that the statute was unnecessarily restrictive and that there were less
burdensome alternatives that would achieve the same objective.23°
The Court determined that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of
review because the chilling effect of § 505 on a particular genre of speech
was apparent and quantifiable. 23' Applying the doctrine set forth in Sable,
the Court affirmed that "[t]he Government may... regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest
if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.
232
The overriding justification for § 505 was the need to protect children from
233 thindecent content, yet the Court found that the Government provided no
quantifiable data to show that children were actually being harmed by con-
tent accessed because of signal bleed. 3 Instead, the Court saw a situation
in which protected speech was silenced for two-thirds of the day in homes
serviced by cable operators.2 35 As in Sable, the Court observed that the
effect of § 505 was to significantly prohibit constitutionally protected
communications "between speakers and willing adult listeners. '"236
While the Court recognized that the purpose of § 505 was aimed at pre-
venting children from inadvertent exposure to indecent material, another
section of the 1996 Act provided a viable solution for parents to exercise
228 Id. at 811-12 ("The statutory disability appl[ied] to channels 'primarily dedicated to
sexually-oriented programming."' (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 561 (a) (1994, Supp. 11)).
229 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 803, 809, 813 (noting that according to one survey sixty-nine
percent of operators complied with § 505 through time channeling).
230 Id. at 807.
231 Id. at 809, 813.
232 Id. at 813 (quoting Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
'Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid,' and the government bears the bur-
den to rebut that presumption." Id. at 817 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382
(1992)).
233 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811.
234 Id. at 819. Specifically the Court stated:
[A] central weakness in the Government's proof. [Is that] [t]here is little hard evidence
of how widespread or how serious the problem of signal bleed is.... To say that mil-
lions of children are subject to a risk of viewing signal bleed is one thing; to avoid ar-
ticulating the true nature and extent of the risk is quite another.
Id. Additionally, the Government failed to show that society wanted more stringent protec-
tion for children from signal bleed. Id. "A survey of cable operators determined that fewer
than 0.5% of cable subscribers requested full blocking during that time." Id. at 816.
235 Id. at 812.
236 Id. at 812. "[E]ven where speech is indecent and enters the home, the objective of
shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accom-
plished by a less restrictive alternative." Id. at 814.
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their discretion and block the programming without eliminating the ability
of willing adults to access it.237 Section 504 required that cable operators
facilitate and comply with individual consumer requests that specific chan-
nels be blocked.118 Section 504 presented a content-neutral approach that
applied equally to all cable programming, as customers could elect to block
any channel, not just sexually-explicit content.239 In this regard, § 504 pre-
sented a viable and less restrictive alternative to § 505 and consequently,
imposed less restraint on Playboy's First Amendment right to free speech.
The Court stated that when the goal of content-based speech restrictions
are "to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right
of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists. We
are expected to protect our own sensibilities 'simply by averting [our]
eyes."' 24 Thus, the Court acknowledged the role of individual autonomy in
providing parents the ability to voluntarily block offensive content from
entering their homes. Whereas the Court struck down § 505 as too burden-
some on speech, it upheld § 504 because it presented a viable, less restric-
tive means of achieving the government's objective.24'
4. First Amendment Jurisprudence Regarding the Internet is Distin-
guished from Broadcast and Cable Services
Unlike broadcast and cable services, the Internet is subject to far less
governmental intrusion due to its classification as an information service
under the 1996 Act.242 Congress intended that the Internet remain free from
governmental intrusion in order to promote a robust forum for the dis-
course of political and social ideology as well as providing entertainment
services.243 Congress determined that legislative attempts to restrict content
on the Internet would impede rather than foster growth within that arena.24
237 Id. at 805.
238 Id. at 810.
239 Id. at 809-10 (citing the District Court which concluded that a regime in which view-
ers could order signal blocking on a household-by-household basis presented an effective,
less restrictive alternative to § 505).
240 Id. at 813 (emphasis added) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)); cf.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (distinguishing cable signals from broadcast signals).
Cable Signals involve a subscription so that they are not readily accessible by the general
public and the consumer has the ability to block unwanted programming voluntarily. Play-
boy, 529 U.S. at 814. Conversely, a broadcast signal is free of charge, has a ubiquitous
presence, and the listener or viewer is unable to block content before it reaches their home.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
241 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 805.
242 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
243 Congress' desire that the Internet operate unfettered by regulation can be found in the
policy statement of § 509 of the 1996 Act (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230).
244 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000); see also Crawford, supra note 62, at 704-05. Congressional
findings on the Internet are set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230 (a) which states:
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However, this does not imply that the Internet operates free from regula-
tion. In fact, Congress explicitly stated that the Internet is not to be used for
criminal purposes such as child pornography.245 Additionally, laws that
protect Internet users from spam and identity theft have been upheld,246 and
Internet "luring laws" 247 designed to protect children from sexual predators
have been found constitutionally sound by many courts. 248 Like other
forms of media, when Congress does act to restrict content-based speech
on the Internet, the regulation must be narrowly tailored to a particular
government interest249 and must not chill more speech than necessary to
achieve that objective.
Federal legislation designed to protect children from indecent and ob-
scene content available over the Internet has failed to meet this burden.
The first attempt, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), a
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, was challenged in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union. I Section 223(a) of the CDA prohibited
the transmission of obscene or indecent messages and material over the
Internet to anyone under the age of eighteen.25 2 Section 223(d) prohibited
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availabil-
ity of educational and informational resources to our citizens ... (4) The Internet and
other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans,
with a minimum of government regulation....
§ 230.
245 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(5) ("It is the policy of the United States ... (5) to ensure vigor-
ous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalk-
ing, and harassment by means of computer.").
246 See generally CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2004)
(codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713); Gordon v. Impulse Marketing Group, Inc., 375 F.
Sup . 2d 1040, 1044 (2005).
The Department of Justice prosecutes these actions under 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2000),
which criminalizes soliciting or enticing a minor to participate in sexual conduct. Many
states have adopted their own Internet luring legislation which criminalizes conduct that is
intended to lure children from their homes via the Internet. See M. Megan McCune, VIR-
TUAL LOLLIPOPS AND LOST PuPPIEs: How FAR CAN STATES Go To PROTECT MINORS
THROUGH THE USE OF INTERNET LURING LAWS, 14.2 COMLAW CONSPECTUS 503, 507 n.25
(2006) (citing Internet luring statutes from across the United States).
248 See, e.g., McCune, supra note 247, at 507 n.25.
249 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) ("[W]e have repeatedly recognized the
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials. But that interest does
not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults." (citations
omitted)); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2002) ("[A] court assumes that certain
protected speech may be regulated, and then asks what is the least restrictive alternative that
can be used to achieve that goal.")
250 Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666 ("The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is re-
stricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure that le-
gitimate speech is not chilled or punished.").
251 Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
252 Id. at 858-59 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II)).
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the knowing transmission or display of any "patently offensive" messages
to anyone younger than eighteen. 3
The Court found that the government had a legitimate interest in enforc-
ing obscenity and child pornography laws.254 However, noting that the ex-
isting "cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to the Internet," the Court wrestled with the
appropriate form of review for content-based restrictions on the Internet. 5
Particularly troubling to the Court was that the statutory language defining
the term "indecent" was unclear and the fact that the statute imposed
criminal sanctions based upon that loose definition of "indecent." 256 The
vagueness of such a content-based regulation, coupled with its deterrent
effect as a criminal statute, "raises special First Amendment concerns be-
cause of its obvious chilling effect on free speech."257
In determining whether the indecency provision was valid, the Court
suggested that while filtering technology that limited content may be an
efficient and more importantly less intrusive alternative to the CDA, it was
not widely available at the time. 8 Accordingly, the Court determined that
the CDA was unconstitutionally overbroad in light of a less invasive means
of furthering the legitimate government interest of shielding children from
harmful content.259 In doing so, the Court noted that "[t]he interest in en-
couraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship. ' 26
253 Id. at 859-860. Specifically, 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) provides:
(d) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image,
or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently of-
fensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call
or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's con-
trol to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be
used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
Id. The breadth of these prohibitions is qualified by two affirmative defenses. Reno, 521
U.S. at 860.
254 Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
255 id.
256 Id. at 870-72 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991)).
257 Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)).
258 Reno, 521 U.S. at 877.
259 Id. at 874-82.
260 Id. at 885.
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In 2004, the Court revisited the issue of content regulation on the Internet
in Ashcroft v. ACLU.261 In 1998, Congress passed the Child Online Protec-
tion Act ("COPA") to, like the CDA, "protect children from being exposed
to harmful material found on the Internet., 262 The COPA imposed criminal
penalties including jail time and a $50,000 fine for the dissemination of
sexually explicit material deemed "harmful to minors., 263 The regulation
was aimed primarily at online content-providers and exclusively targeted
sexually explicit material.26"
The Court queried whether the COPA was the only means of protecting
children from indecent Internet.265 Rejecting age verification as an effective
substitute the Court ultimately found that filters "impose[d] selective re-
strictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the
source," 266 and held that filters may pose a less restrictive alternative to
COPA which may make the act unconstitutional, however, the case was
remanded again for a factual determination on the matter.267
V. INHERENT FAILURES OF CONTENT REGULATION AS
APPLIED TO MOBILE TV
If Congress continues its trend in seeking to regulate the dissemination of
indecent content via communications media, it will likely seek to impose
restrictions on the delivery of content over Mobile TV. The question re-
mains whether such regulation could adequately address public policy con-
cerns regarding children while withstanding First Amendment scrutiny. As
261 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
262 Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1402, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)).
263 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)(200). "Material that is harmful to minors" is defined as:
[Any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing,
or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal
to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect
to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simu-
lated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-
pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
for minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
The term "minor" is defined as "any person under 17 years of age." 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).
A person acts for "commercial purposes" "only if such person is engaged in the business of
making such communications." 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(2)(A).
264 See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656, 661-63 (2004).
265 Id. at 666-67.
266 Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
267 Id. at 666-67.
2006]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
discussed above, Mobile TV is best classified as an information service
analogous to VolP.268 As an information service, Mobile TV should ex-
perience greater freedom in making available many types of content, in-
cluding that which may be deemed indecent. The Court has spoken repeat-
edly that the government has a legitimate interest in enforcing sanctions
against the dissemination of indecent content to children.269 However, that
legitimate interest cannot withstand scrutiny if it is overly burdensome to
speech. This section addresses the issues to be confronted should Congress
determine that regulation of Mobile TV is warranted.
Should the government choose to impose content regulations on sexually
explicit speech, it must be sure to enact legislation that is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling interest.270 While the goal of protecting children
from sexually indecent material has been held as valid, the Court has been
willing to allow the enforcement of such measures if the legislation is the
only means of effectively achieving the objective.27' If an alternative exists
that is less restrictive, the Court is apt to find that the legislation is inva-
lid.272 Applying these principles to Mobile TV, the judiciary will likely
consider both the nature of the service, the manner in which the content is
provided, and viable legislative alternatives.
It is unlikely that the arguments that sustained the regulation of broadcast
services will be sufficient to support content-based restrictions on speech
for Mobile TV. The government was permitted to dictate content require-
ments for radio transmission in Red Lion on the premise of broadcast spec-
trum scarcity. 273 However, this argument is inapplicable to an information
service as the content publisher does not utilize broadcast spectrum space
to facilitate its communication. Although Mobile TV content is transmitted
via spectrum, that spectrum is specifically dedicated to wireless telephony,
not broadcast. Wireless spectrum is distinguished from broadcast spectrum
in that it has never been deemed a public resource and it is not free to the
public. 4 Instead, the consumer of wireless telephony must pay a fee for
the service. Thus wireless spectrum cannot be deemed to be ubiquitous in
nature and any corresponding concerns must be dismissed. Additionally,
268 See discussion supra Part III.
269 See Sable Commc'ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 119 (1989); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997).
270 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 119; see also Notice of Apparent Liability, supra 69, 7 3.
271 See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that blocking
indecent radio broadcast during the time when children are likely to be listening was the
most effective means of protecting children who may be in the listening audience).
272 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2002); see also
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
273 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
274 Jason M. Kueser, This LAN is My LAN, This LAN is Your LAN: The Case for Extend-




the network provider of wireless service has never been deemed to have
control over the content of transmission between subscribers, but instead
merely provides the conduit over which content flows. Thus, although one
aspect of Mobile TV's transmission is via spectrum, it is not of the type
that has historically involved governmental attempts to restrict the trans-
mission of speech.
The divergence between broadcast and information services extends fur-
ther. Broadcast licensees were treated as proxies for the listening commu-
nity.275 However, the monopoly rationale that supported this proposition
was applicable to the specific role of radio broadcast in 1969-a time when
there were few outlets for the dissemination of communications. 76 Red
Lion is applicable to the regulation of information services insofar as the
Court endeavored to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas' '277 in
accordance with tenets of free speech.2 78 This philosophy is consistent with
Congress' goal to preserve an "under-regulated" Internet.
The distinction between broadcast communication and information ser-
vices, particularly Mobile TV, is better illustrated by a comparison be-
tween the rationale in Pacifica and that of Internet service. In Pacifica, free
access and broadcast signal ubiquity were critical to the Court's deci-
sion.279 The listener was considered subject to the will of the broadcaster
once the radio is turned on and the damage from obscenity is inflicted the
moment that the listener hears it, even if such content was accidental.280 In
this way, the listener was held captive to the broadcast content. This pas-
sive-listener rationale, however, is not present in the Mobile TV context.
First, broadcast is considered a one-way transmission from the content
provider (e.g. the broadcaster) to the entire listening or viewing audience.
In contrast, the Internet involves two-way communications between the
individual and the content publisher. Second, Mobile TV is not a free ser-
vice. It is a subscription service based on fees charged by the wireless
phone service provider, the content publisher, or both. 281 Thus, the con-
sumer of Mobile TV takes at least two active steps: first, through the pur-
chase of a device capable of carrying the video content, and second, in
requesting and paying for the material. Because Mobile TV requires a sub-
scription, its presence is certainly not ubiquitous or unavoidable. There-
fore, unlike broadcast radio or television, there is no risk that someone may
inadvertently access the content simply by turning on a mobile device.
275 See discussion supra Part III, IV.D. 1.
276 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90.
277 Id. at 390.
278 id.
279 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
280 id.
281 See Marguerite Reardon, Cingular Launches Mobile-TV Service, CNETNEWS.COm,




The constitutional issues addressed in cable content regulation appear
relevant, but they are not yet applicable to the Mobile TV marketplace.
While finding content-specific regulation unconstitutional, the Court in
Playboy agreed that requiring content providers to offer consumers the
option against receipt of unwanted content was a reasonable means toward
achieving the goal of protecting children from unfettered access to inde-
cency.282 However, until Mobile TV technology develops more sophisti-
cated mechanisms to allow consumers to block specific Mobile TV con-
tent, any regulation to restrict content delivery will fail the least restrictive
means test.
For the appropriate regulatory paradigm, prospective Mobile TV content
regulators must look to Sable and the attempt to restrict dial-a-porn. In
Sable, the Court held that the individual volition necessary to access the
offensive content ensured that its audience "will generally not be unwilling
listeners" such as children.283 By its nature and mechanics, Mobile TV is
similar to the dial-a-porn service at issue in Sable, as both require that con-
sumers take active, physical steps in initiating the contact with the content
provider, and require the consumer to make a series of voluntary selections
to agree to the delivery of the content, including agreeing to a method of
payment for the material. Accordingly, Mobile TV is not pervasive such
that there is a risk that an unwilling consumer such as a child will be held
captive to indecent material.
If lawmakers choose to impose content-based restrictions on Mobile TV
in order to protect children, they must structure the statutory language such
that it does not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of adults. An
appropriate balance must be struck between the Constitutional protection
to which sexually indecent speech is entitled and the legitimate interest of
protecting children from harmful material.284 In striking such a balance in
the case of Mobile TV, it is unlikely that the Court will uphold any con-
tent-based blanket restriction on indecent speech accessible through Mo-
bile TV. The Court is willing to uphold restrictions on indecent content for
a medium of communications only where there are no less-restrictive alter-
natives available.285 Due to the range of less-restrictive alternatives avail-
able, any such content-based restriction on Mobile TV would surely be
struck down by the Court.
282 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
283 Sable Comnc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).
284 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
285 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
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VI. NON-GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION: PARENTS AND
INDUSTRY
A. Parents have the power
The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that one "should not assume a
plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective; and a court
should not presume parents, given full information, will fail to act. ' '286 Par-
ents currently have numerous options to prevent their children from access-
ing harmful material over Mobile TV. First, parents have the power to se-
lect phones for their children that lack Mobile TV capability, or to choose
phones with limited service options designed specifically for children.287
Second, parents who opt to purchase handhelds with Mobile TV capability
can refrain from subscribing to the service. Third, parents who choose to
allow their children access to Mobile TV have, in effect, "come to the nui-
sance." 288 As the primary consumers of Mobile TV, parents have both the
ability and the responsibility to be informed as to the devices their children
are using and to be aware of the material available through interactive ser-
vices. While it may be a legitimate government interest, it is not the gov-
ernment's duty to police Mobile TV for the possibility that children might
access indecent content. Rather, it is incumbent upon parents to exercise
supervision, whether by selecting the most appropriate device for their
children, by monitoring service bills to ensure their children are not visit-
ing offensive Web sites, or by restricting their children's access to credit
cards in order to ensure that, even if they access the sites, the children are
unable to access the indecent content therein. 289
286 Id. at 824.
287 See, e.g., Firefly Mobile, The Mobile Phone for Mobile Kids,
http://www.fireflymobile.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2006). Firefly Mobile markets a phone
specifically designed for children. This phone has only five buttons and can only be used
for voice services. Id. Likewise, Verizon offers a "kid-friendly wireless phone" with a sim-
plified keypad and the ability to store four programmed phone numbers. In addition, Veri-
zon explicitly explains that Migo does not support such features as Internet access or mobile
content. VerizonWireless.Com, LG Migo,
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/store/controller?item=phoneFirst&action=viewPhone
Detail&selectedPhoneld=2060 (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
288 Property law rationale that individuals who know of a nuisance situation prior to
moving into an area, and still choose to reside by it, have forfeited the legal right to chal-
lenge its existence. See In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding
their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 4975, 13 (Mar. 3, 2004); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731-32
(1978) (discussing how the FCC argued for indecent broadcasts to be governed by the prin-
ciples of nuisance law).
289 See FCC-to-CTIA Letter, supra note 35. John Muleta, Chief of the Wireless Tele-
communication Bureau of the FCC stated that, "[w]ith adult content available from a myr-
iad of sources, now more than ever it is important for carriers, content providers, and par-
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B. An Industry Solution
In November 2005, the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Associa-
tion ("CTIA"), an international trade association for the wireless telecommu-
nications industry, adopted "Wireless Content Guidelines."2 90 These guidelines
demonstrate "a voluntary pledge by the industry to proactively provide tools
and controls to manage wireless content offered by the wireless telephone
service carriers or available via Intemet-enabled wireless devices. 29' The
guidelines are an attempt by the wireless industry to develop a standardized
rating system for mobile video content based upon the traditional movie rating
system, a methodology chosen for its familiarity to a wide range of consum-
ers.
29 2
There are two phases for the implementation of the CTIA rating system.
The first phase, which became effective in November, called for the classi-
fication of mobile video material as either "Generally Accessible Carrier
Content" or "Restricted Carrier Content., 293 Generally Accessible Content
is considered appropriate for people of all ages and no controls are required
to offer the content via Mobile TV.294 Conversely, in order for a service
provider to offer Restricted Carrier Content, the carrier must provide con-
sumer controls to restrict access to content prior to offering the material. 295
These guidelines were designed to provide parents with the ability to select
the classification of content they deem appropriate for their children.296
The second phase of the Wireless Content Guidelines initiative, which
has yet to take effect, "will be for carriers to develop and implement Inter-
net Content Access Control technologies that will enable wireless account
holders to block access to the [I]nternet entirely or provide tools to block
access to specific websites that consumers might consider inappropri-
ate. 297 This phase will be achieved as wireless carriers independently de-
ents to know what is being done by industry to prevent access to adult content by minors, as
well as what they can do to protect their children." Id.
290 CTIA Press Release, supra note 20.
291 id.
292 id.
293 Id.; see also CTIA, Wireless Content Guidelines Classification Criteria (Nov. 2005),
available at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIABoardApproved-Guidelines.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2006).
Content is generally considered "Restricted" if it contains any of the following restricted
content identifiers: intense profanity, intense violence, graphic depiction of sexual activity
or sexual behaviors, nudity, hate speech, graphic depiction of illegal drug use, any activities
that are restricted by law to those 18 years of age and older, such as gambling and lotteries."
Any "Restricted Carrier Content" will be considered "Generally Accessible Carrier Con-
tent" and will be available to all consumers. Id.
294 Id.





velop filters and other content-blocking technologies for their devices. The
CTIA acknowledges that although carriers cannot control the actual con-
tent that their users access via the Internet, the proactive step is necessary
to allow consumers the ability to limit Internet content accessible to their
families.298 The CTIA sees the guidelines as a way for wireless service
providers to offer a wider variety of content to consumers. 299 Then-FCC
Commissioner, Kathleen Q. Abernathy, supported the initiatives, saying
that "[t]he voluntary initiative announced ... by [the] CTIA demonstrates
that the wireless industry appreciates these challenges and is willing to
better empower parents.,, 300 However, former FCC telecommunications
bureau chief and current Legg Mason telecommunications analyst, Re-
becca Abrogast, believes that the guidelines are merely an attempt to fore-
stall governmental regulation.30'
The guidelines might well be an effort to forestall regulation, but it is
precisely for that reason they should not be disregarded. After several
failed attempts in the 1990s to restrict sexually explicit and indecent pro-
gramming on cable television, Congress eventually enacted a statute that
mandated the implementation of a similar program to the CTIA guide-
lines.3°2 Under the 1996 Act, cable service providers must provide their
subscribers with the ability to fully block programs the subscriber deter-
mines are inappropriate for their households. 3 Congress also mandated
that a voluntary content ratings system be established and that every televi-
sion set (of 13" or more) be equipped with content-blocking technology.3°
In response, the cable, broadcasting, and movie industries developed the
"TV Parental Guidelines" to provide parents with a tool for evaluating
broadcast and cable programming for age-appropriateness according to the
amount of sexual content, violence and adult language or themes in the
298 Id.; see also Matt Richtel, Carriers Adopt Content Rating For Cellphones, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at C5.
299 See Press Release, MobileMedia.com, CTIA To Create Ratings System For Wireless
Content (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://www.mobiledia.comlnews/30063.html. Cingu-
lar Wireless VP of Data Product Management, Jim Ryan, has stated that,
until we can provide filtering and control for parents, we will offer only the broadcast
version of content. When we can provide an 18-plus category, we'll look at the ability
to offer other things. Our job is not to restrict or to regulate access to content. Our job
is to provide choice and provide control.
Id.
300 Associated Press, Cell Phones Adopt Ratings for Content, TELECOMDIRECT NEWS,
Nov. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.telecomdirectnews.condo.php/15377?tpl=/Iook/printfriendly.tpl.
301 Mark Rockwell, Content Ratings: "V" Is for Voluntary, WIRELESS WEEK, Dec. 1,
2005, http://www.wirelessweek.com/index.asp?iayout=articlePrint&articlelD=CA6288012.
302 See discussion supra Part III.
303 47 U.S.C. § 560 (2000); see also FCC Fact Sheet, supra note 146.
304 47 U.S.C. § 303(x).
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program. °5 The ratings system was designed to work in conjunction with
the V-Chip, a technological mechanism built into every television set
manufactured after January 2000.306 "The V-Chip reads information en-
coded in the rated program and blocks programs from the [television] set
based upon the rating selected by the parent. 307
The CTIA Guidelines demonstrate a viable alternative to the sort of fed-
eral intrusion into the industry that cable and broadcast saw in the 1996
Act. Once the CTIA Guidelines can be coupled with filtering or blocking
technology comparable to the television V-Chip, arguments for additional
safeguard measures or explicit prohibitions on content will lack credibility.
Voluntary and universal adoption of the same measures mandated for
broadcast and cable will demonstrate that regulations applicable to the
Mobile TV industry are unnecessary to protect children from objectionable
content.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mobile TV is a chimeric service that should be treated as an information
service under the 1996 Act because it is strictly a means "for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or mak-
ing available information via telecommunications. 3 8 However, because
Mobile TV encompasses characteristics of telecommunications, cable, and
Internet service, attempts to impose content-based regulations on Mobile
TV may be challenged and reviewed in light of First Amendment prece-
dent regarding each of these media. Moreover, because less-restrictive al-
ternatives to content-based regulation exist to undermine any federal legis-
lation attempting to restrict Mobile TV content, Congress should refrain
from legislating in this area. The public policy concern presented by Mo-
bile TV, adult entertainment and children's access is real, but the wireless
industry has already undertaken preemptive initiatives to address potential
problems in the nascent Mobile TV. The industry should be given the op-
portunity to develop technologies that allow consumers the ability to block
or access content at their choosing. Furthermore, a collaboration between
the industry and parents to address concerns of sexually indecent Mobile
TV content should be encouraged. Such a unified effort will benefit society
not only by shielding children from sexually indecent material, but also by
305 The TV Parental Guidelines, About the TV Ratings and V-Chip,
http://www.tvguidelines.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2006); see also, FCC, V-Chip: Viewing
Television Responsibly, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) [hereinafter
V-Chip].
306 V-Chip, supra note 305.
307 Id.
308 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
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ensuring that the legitimate uses of this content are communicated to will-
ing adult listeners.

